On the optimality of bank capital requirement policy in a macroeconomic framework
Year of publication: |
November 2014
|
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Authors: | Catalán, Mario ; Ganapolsky, Eduardo |
Published in: |
Journal of applied economics. - Buenos Aires, ISSN 1514-0326, ZDB-ID 1480229-6. - Vol. 17.2014, 2, p. 229-255
|
Subject: | macro-prudential | capital requirements | bank regulation | deposit insurance | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Basler Akkord | Basel Accord | Theorie | Theory | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Kapitalbedarf | Capital requirements | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis |
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