On the optimality of not allocating

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Hernando-Veciana, Ángel ; Michelucci, Fabio
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 2, p. 233-235
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Efficiency \| Auctions \| Mechanism design

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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