On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

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Year of publication:	2012-07
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Rübbelke, Dirk
Institutions:	College of Business and Economics, Australian National University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages longPages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107167