On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Jost, Peter-J. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 68.1996, 2, p. 510-530
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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