On the role of social wage comparisons in gift-exchange experiments

Ch’ng Kean Siang; Till Requate; Israel Waichman

This study extends a bilateral gift exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010) who investigate how feedback of information about wages paid in the market affects both employers’ wage setting and workers’ performance. We provide either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker-employer-relationships, and we also study repeated relationships (fixedmatching). We find that information on the average wage reduces (increases) both wage offers and effort levels in one-shot (repeated) relationships. -- Gift-exchange ; reciprocity ; wage difference ; economic experiment

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ch'ng, Kean Siang ; Requate, Tilman ; Waichman, Israel
Publisher:	Kiel : Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Lohnstruktur \| Wage structure \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation \| Austauschtheorie \| Social exchange theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Experiment

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 557 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Economics working paper. - Kiel : Univ., Dep. of Economics, ISSN 2193-2476, ZDB-ID 2111620-9. - Vol. 2010-11
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/44351 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822194