On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

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Year of publication:	2005-04-06
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; Winden, Frans van
Institutions:	Tinbergen Instituut
Subject:	Spatial voting models \| electoral competition \| winning set \| interest groups

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 05-034/1
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256524