On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; Winden, Frans van
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	spatial voting models \| electoral competition \| winning set \| interest groups

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 1698
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765946