On the Stability of Cooperation Structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

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Year of publication:	2000-11-22
Authors:	Haeringer, Guillaume
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	Cooperation structure \| graph \| Myerson value \| stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	8 pages long
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572166