On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du
| Year of publication: |
2024
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| Authors: | Brooks, Ben ; Du, Songzi |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 92.2024, 5, p. 1391-1438
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| Subject: | Bayes correlated equilibrium | information design | max-min | Mechanism design | optimal auctions | public expenditure | robustness | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/ECTA20240 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015117828