On the structure of stable tournament solutions
Year of publication: |
March 2018
|
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Authors: | Brandt, Felix ; Brill, Markus ; Seedig, Hans Georg ; Warut Suksompong |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 65.2018, 2, p. 483-507
|
Subject: | Choice consistency | Tournament solutions | Bipartisan set | Tournament equilibrium set | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Wettbewerb | Competition | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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