On the use of menus in sequential common agency
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Calzolari, Giacomo ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 64.2008, 1, p. 329-334
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Sequential contracting Mechanism design Menus theorems |
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