Optical allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Brocas, Isabelle |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 75.2013, 3, p. 359-387
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Subject: | Auctions | Type-dependent externalities | Mechanism design | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Allokation | Allocation | Auktion | Auction | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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