Optimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders

We consider an environment with a single divisible good and two bidders. The valuations of the bidders are private information but one bidder has a commonly known budget constraint. For this environment we derive the revenue maximizing subsidy free incentive compatible auction. We also examine the case when the budget constraint is private information but bidders must post a bond.

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Year of publication:	2005-12
Authors:	Malakhov, Alexey ; Vohra, Rakesh V.
Institutions:	Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 1419
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588656