Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders

I consider optimal auctions for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers, organized as " well-coordinated " cartel. I show that, even though the seller cannot deter collusion, he can optimally accommodate it by employing a simple mechanism which imposes an inefficient allocation on the bidders unless they pay a sufficiently high amount to avoid it.

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Year of publication:	2009-12
Authors:	Gruyer, Nicolas
Institutions:	HAL

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-enac.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01021568 Published, Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009, 57, 4, pp 835-850
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820826