Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control

This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory.

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Nöldeke, Georg ; Samuelson, Larry
Publisher:	Basel : University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Subject:	Principal-Agent Problem \| Bunching \| Nonlinear Pricing \| Assignment Approach

More details

Series:	WWZ Discussion Paper ; 2006/12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5451/unibas-ep61248 [DOI] 874914019 [GVK] hdl:10419/123364 [Handle] RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2006/12 [RePEc]
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	EconStor

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