Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Year of publication: |
2004-08-11
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Authors: | Singh, Rajdeep ; Povel, Paul |
Institutions: | Econometric Society |
Subject: | Auctions | Common Value Auctions | Asymmetric Bidders | Winner’s Curse |
Extent: | text/plain |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Econometric Society North American Winter Meetings 2004 Number 51 |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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