Optimal compensation and pay-performance sensitivity in a continuous-time principal-agent model
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Ju, Nengjiu ; Wan, Xuhu |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 58.2012, 3, p. 641-657
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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