Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chu, Xiang ; Liu, Jun ; Ren, Long ; Gong, Daqing |
Published in: |
Transportation research / E : an international journal. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1366-5545, ZDB-ID 1380969-6. - Vol. 139.2020, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Common agency | Incentive payment | Last-mile logistics | Moral hazard | Profit-sharing contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Logistik | Logistics | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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