Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
Year of publication: |
1991
|
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Authors: | Page, Frank H. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 1.1991, 4, p. 323-338
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Theorie | Theory |
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