Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roger, Guillaume |
Published in: |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 5.2013, 4, p. 55-80
|
Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
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