Optimal contracts under costly state falsification
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm |
Other Persons: | Weinberg, John A. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 97.1989, 6, p. 1345-1363
|
Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Informationskosten | Information costs | Theorie | Theory |
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