Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Barron, Daniel ; Georgiadis, George ; Swinkels, Jeroen M. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 15.2020, 2, p. 715-761
|
Subject: | Risk-taking | contract theory | gaming | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Risiko | Risk |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE3660 [DOI] hdl:10419/253477 [Handle] |
Classification: | M2 - Business Economics ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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