Optimal design of deferred compensation for bank executives under agency conflicts
Liu Gan, Mingyu Xu, Yingxian Tan, Linyue Chen
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Gan, Liu ; Xu, Mingyu ; Tan, Yingxian ; Chen, Linyue |
| Published in: |
International review of finance : the official journal of the Asia Pacific Finance Association and the Nippon Finance Association. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-2443, ZDB-ID 2034475-2. - Vol. 24.2024, 4, p. 772-792
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| Subject: | deferred compensation | risk shifting | write-down debt | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1111/irfi.12477 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135507