Optimal Dynamic Antitrust Policies.

In a two period model with asymmetric information the authors study the optimal antitrust policies carried out by a pulbic agency faced with firms' horizontal price-fixing behaviour. They analyse the effect on social welfare in case the Antitrust Authority decides to bind itself to follow the same policy, an investigation procedure, over the two periods. They interprest this policy as the adoption af antitrust guidelines.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Rovesti, C.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	ANTITRUST LEGISLATION \| DYNAMIC ANALYSIS \| REGULATION

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634204