Optimal dynamic lending contracts with imperfect enforceability
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Albuquerque, Rui ; Hopenhayn, Hugo Andrés |
Publisher: |
Rochester, NY |
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertrag | Contract |
Extent: | 37 S |
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Series: | Rochester Center for Economic Research working paper. - Rochester, NY, ZDB-ID 2171120-3. - Vol. 439 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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