Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chakrabarti, Subir K. ; Kim, Jaesoo |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7187, ZDB-ID 1478916-4. - Vol. 94.2023, 3, p. 379-404
|
Subject: | Adverse selection | Games with incomplete information | Optimal contracts with commitment | Optimal contracts with no commitment | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | Pooling contracts | Separating contracts | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Adverse Selektion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
-
Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity
Bassi, Matteo, (2014)
-
Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection
Tan, Lihua, (2024)
-
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Gottlieb, Daniel, (2022)
- More ...
-
Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information
Chakrabarti, Subir K., (1999)
-
Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information
Chakrabarti, Subir K., (1992)
-
Finite complexity and the folk theorem in repeated games
Chakrabarti, Subir K., (1991)
- More ...