Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly.
A new welfare-enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new-product industry. An export-subsidy policy promotes the (rational) perception that a high-quality export can be provided at a relatively low price. Thus, an export subsidy generates a first-order benefit to welfare by enabling a high-quality export to be sold at a less-distorted high price. The subsidy will also introduce distortions into the price of a low-quality export and the quality-selection process. Since these choices are initially undistorted, however, the export-country welfare loss arising from new distortions is of second-order importance. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Bagwell, Kyle |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 81.1991, 5, p. 1156-69
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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