Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Franke, Jörg ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Wasser, Cédric |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | all-pay auction | lottery contest | favoritism | head start | revenue dominance |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 6274 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 877630801 [GVK] hdl:10419/155516 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_6274 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
-
Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests
Franke, Jörg, (2016)
-
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
Franke, Jörg, (2014)
-
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
Franke, Jörg, (2014)
- More ...
-
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
Franke, Jörg, (2014)
-
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
Franke, Jörg, (2014)
-
Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests
Franke, Jörg, (2018)
- More ...