Optimal firms' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality

We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 955
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4048 [DOI] 898691400 [GVK] hdl:10419/159794 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP955 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; P13 - Cooperative Enterprises ; Q50 - Environmental Economics. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651847