Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Englmaier, Florian ; Muehlheusser, Gerd ; Roider, Andreas |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | Anreizvertrag | Arbeitsmobilität | Moral Hazard | Beschränkte Haftung | Theorie | Moral hazard | limited commitment | ex-post outside option | limited liability |
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 5027 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 631270590 [GVK] hdl:10419/36974 [Handle] |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K31 - Labor Law ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian, (2010)
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
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