Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Alternative title: | Moral hazard, one-sided commitment, and endogenous outside options |
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Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Englmaier, Florian ; Mühlheußer, Gerd ; Roider, Andreas |
Published in: | |
Publisher: |
Kiel : ZBW |
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Theorie | Theory |
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