Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ciccarone, Giuseppe ; Marchetti, Enrico |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 150.2012, 1, p. 263-282
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Central bank | Common agency | Monetary policy | Transparency |
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