Optimal managerial hedging and contracting with self-esteem concerns
Year of publication: |
May 2015
|
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Authors: | Choe, Chongwoo ; Lien, Da-hsiang Donald ; Yu, Chia-Feng |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 37.2015, p. 354-367
|
Subject: | Managerial hedging | Executive compensation | Self-esteem | Agency cost | Hedging | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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