Optimal marginal deterrence and incentives for precaution
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Thomas, Lionel |
Published in: |
Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with European Association of Law and Economics .... - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1555-5879, ZDB-ID 2191851-X. - Vol. 11.2015, 3, p. 409-433
|
Subject: | marginal deterrence | precaution | moral hazard | incentives | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Anreiz | Incentives | Strafe | Punishment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1515/rle-2012-0009 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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