Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy |
Published in: |
International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 29.2011, 4, p. 426-431
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Optimal mechanism Vickrey auction Mediator |
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