Optimal mix of penalties in a principal-agent model under different institutional arrangements
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Earnhart, Dietrich |
Published in: |
The review of economics and statistics. - Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ISSN 0034-6535, ZDB-ID 207962-8. - Vol. 82.2000, 4, p. 634-645
|
Subject: | Strafe | Punishment | Planwirtschaft | Planned economy | Marktwirtschaft | Market economy | Geld | Money | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Tschechien | Czech Republic | 1988-1992 |
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