OPTIMAL MIX OF PENALTIES IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL UNDER DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Earnhart, Dietrich |
Published in: |
The review of economics and statistics. - Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, ISSN 0034-6535, ZDB-ID 2079628. - Vol. 82.2000, 4, p. 634-645
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