Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arieli, Itai ; Babichenko, Yakov ; Smorodinsky, Rann ; Yamashita, Takuro |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 1, p. 15-36
|
Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | bi-pooling | extreme points | information disclosure | mean preserving contraction | price function | signaling | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kommunikation | Communication |
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