Optimal procurement contracts with pre-project planning
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 78.2011, 3, p. 1015-1041
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Subject: | Beschaffung | Procurement | Vertrag | Contract | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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