Optimal Promotion and Span of Control.

Let an organization, such as a government or a firm, evaluate projects with the aim of maximizing social welfare or profits. Each project is evaluated by an agent, who may err. Some agents, however, are more likely to make a correct evaluation. Agents may revealed as making correct evaluations can be promoted to evaluate projects. The paper considers the optimal allocation of project evaluations to agents under these conditions.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Glazer, A.
Institutions:	California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
Subject:	SOCIAL WELFARE \| OPTIMIZATION

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Series:	California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	14 pages
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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