Optimal ratcheting in executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Hwang, Iny ; Kim, Youngsoo ; Lim, Michael K. |
Published in: |
Decision analysis : a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS PubsOnline, ISSN 1545-8504, ZDB-ID 2128587-1. - Vol. 20.2023, 2, p. 166-185
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Subject: | commitment | informational rent | performance noise | ratcheting | uncertainty | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risiko | Risk | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Ökonomische Rente | Economic rent |
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