Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow

This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions. But when individuals imperfectly observe the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources

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Year of publication:	May 1992
Authors:	Bebchuk, Lucian A.
Other Persons:	Kaplow, Louis (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Strafe \| Punishment \| Risiko \| Risk \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w4079
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w4079 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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