Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariffs wars in the Melitz model
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Felbermayr, Gabriel ; Jung, Benjamin ; Larch, Mario |
| Published in: |
Journal of international economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996, ZDB-ID 120143-8. - Vol. 89.2013, 1, p. 13-25
|
| Subject: | Optimal tariffs | Heterogeneous firms | World Trade Organization | Optimalzoll | Optimal tariff | Zollpolitik | Tariff policy | WTO-Recht | WTO law | Handelskonflikt | Trade dispute | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Zolltheorie | Theory of tariffs | Zoll | Tariffs | Welt | World | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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