Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities

This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	LISI, Gaetano
Published in:	Eastern Journal of European Studies. - Centrul de Studii Europene. - Vol. 2(1).2011, June, p. 5-11
Publisher:	Centrul de Studii Europene
Subject:	optimal taxation \| tax evasion \| underground economy \| job search theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150784