Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities

This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: s/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010-11-27
Authors:	Lisi, Gaetano

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Lisi, Gaetano (2010): Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities.
Classification:	H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224890