OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

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Year of publication:	2005-02
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Neyman, Abraham ; Hernández, Penélope
Institutions:	Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE)
Subject:	Repeated games \| communication \| entropy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers. Serie AD.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published by Ivie 38 pages
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731241