Optimal wage contracts under asymmetric information and moral hazard when investment decisions are delegated
by C. N. V. Krishnan
| Year of publication: |
2007
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Krishnan, C. N. V. |
| Published in: |
Journal of economics and finance. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 1055-0925, ZDB-ID 1163091-7. - Vol. 31.2007, 3, p. 302-318
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| Subject: | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003691208