Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lebrun, Bernard |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 2, p. 731-751
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Optimality | Resale | Second-price auction | English auction | Heterogeneous bidders | Efficiency | Behavioral bidding strategies | No-regret property | Multiplicity of equilibria |
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Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale and the Second-Price Auction
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Sequential auctions with heterogeneous bidders
Vincent, Stéphanie, (1998)
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Auctions in which Losers Set the Price
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