Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale

In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zhengʼs (2002), implementation of Myersonʼs (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models, it is achieved through the English auction.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Lebrun, Bernard
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 2, p. 731-751
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Optimality \| Resale \| Second-price auction \| English auction \| Heterogeneous bidders \| Efficiency \| Behavioral bidding strategies \| No-regret property \| Multiplicity of equilibria

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049822