Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Justin Burkett (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University)
| Year of publication: |
January 2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Burkett, Justin |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 1, p. 133-155
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| Subject: | Budget constraints | auctions | mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktion | Auction | Öffentlicher Haushalt | Public budget | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1745 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485703